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Estimating the Spillover Effects of the Tennessee Promise: Exploring
Changes in Tuition, Fees, and Enrollment
By Elizabeth Bell
Tuition-free college policies have gained momentum since the implementation of the Tennessee Promise, which provides financial
aid to students pursuing two-year post-secondary degrees in Tennessee. While previous research has addressed the effects of
similar programs on student outcomes, scholars have yet to thoroughly investigate potential spillover effects of Promise policies on
colleges that are ineligible for Promise funds. In this paper, I leverage a difference-in-differences design to explore changes in
enrollment and tuition and fees at institutions eligible and ineligible for Tennessee Promise funds. First, I find that in-state
enrollment increased significantly at public Promise eligible institutions (mainly public two-year and technical colleges) and instate enrollment decreased at public four-year colleges that are ineligible to receive Promise funds. Moreover, out-of-state
enrollment increased at Promise ineligible public four-year colleges after the Promise was implemented. Second, I find that Black
student enrollment declined by 1-2 percentage points at private colleges ineligible for Promise funds. Finally, public colleges
eligible for Promise funds raised tuition after the Tennessee Promise was implemented. Together, these findings indicate that in
the aftermath of the Tennessee Promise, there were significant changes in enrollment and tuition levels across institutions eligible
and ineligible for Promise funds.

Keywords: higher education finance, tuition-free college, financial aid

T

uition-free college policies have become a cornerstone of policymakers’ efforts to expand college
access, affordability, and degree attainment. To date, researchers estimate more than 300 tuitionfree college initiatives have been proposed or implemented at the state and local level (College
Promise, 2017; Perna & Leigh, 2018). While the tuition-free college movement has its roots in local
pioneering initiatives such as the Kalamazoo Promise and the Pittsburgh Promise (Bartik et al., 2019; Page
et al., 2018), statewide initiatives have also spread across the country, with 16 states currently operating
Promise programs (Perna & Leigh, 2018; Mishory, 2018). Many of the state-wide Promise programs are
similar to the Tennessee Promise. In fact, 9 out of the 16 state Promise programs limit Promise dollars to
two-year degrees and utilize last-dollar structures in which the amount of aid students receive depends on
their eligibility for other Federal and state aid programs—any tuition and fees expenses remaining after
exhausting other Federal and state aid is covered by the Promise (Mishory, 2018). [1] Mounting evidence
suggests that Promise programs can positively impact college enrollment, persistence, and degree
completion (Bartik et al., 2019; Carruthers & Fox, 2016; Page et al., 2018; Harris et al., 2018; Swanson &
Ritter, 2020), but programs that limit funds to cover two-year degrees, like the Tennessee Promise, may also
divert students from four-year to two-year colleges (Gurantz, 2020; Carruthers & Fox, 2016; Nguyen, 2019).
These spillover effects or unintended consequences of Promise programs are a key area for researchers
given the prevalence and power of Promise programs to impact students, families, and institutions of higher
education. For instance, by limiting the types of institutions that are eligible for Promise funds (hereafter,
Promise eligible institutions), programs like the Tennessee Promise could create spillover effects on
institutions ineligible for Promise funds (hereafter, Promise ineligible institutions).
In this analysis, I explore the changes in enrollment and tuition and fees at Promise eligible and
Promise ineligible institutions. Specifically, I leverage annual institutional level data from the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Dataset (IPEDS) from 2012-2016 to evaluate the extent to which Tennessee
Promise eligibility impacted total first-time fall undergraduate enrollment, racial and ethnic minority
enrollment, and tuition and fees at both eligible and ineligible institutions. The empirical analysis reveals
significant shifts in both tuition and fees and enrollment after the implementation of the Tennessee
Promise.
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There are three main findings that are robust across multiple specifications and robustness checks.
First, after the implementation of the Promise scholarship, public Promise eligible institutions experience
large gains in in-state first-time undergraduate enrollment. Furthermore, public ineligible institutions (public
four-year universities) face large declines in in-state enrollment and an increase in out-of-state enrollment.
These changes suggest that ineligible public institutions (public four-year universities) shift to recruiting
more out-of-state students to offset the losses to in-state enrollment and ensure adequate revenue streams.
Second, public Promise eligible institutions (mainly public community & technical colleges) significantly
raised tuition after the implementation of the Tennessee Promise program. This finding is significant not
only in substantive impact but also in its contribution to the literature on how institutions respond when
governments increase direct subsidies to students. In line with the Bennett Hypothesis, which posits that
institutions will raise prices to capture additional government funds when there is an increase in direct
subsidies to students, I find that institutions eligible for Promise funds significantly raised tuition in the
aftermath of the Tennessee Promise implementation (Curs & Dar, 2010a; Doyle et al., 2009). Finally, I find
that black student enrollment at private Promise ineligible universities dropped by approximately 1-2
percentage points after the implementation of the Promise policy, though the statistical significance of this
finding was not consistent across specifications.
The paper proceeds with an in-depth description of the Tennessee Promise policy, followed by the
theoretical framework. Next, I lay out the data, measures, and analytical approach. Finally, I present the
findings and robustness checks and conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications
of the findings.

Policy Background
Due to declining college affordability (Deming & Dynarski, 2010; Baum & Ma, 2014), policymakers have
increasingly utilized tuition-free college policies as a cornerstone of efforts to increase college access and
attainment (College Promise, 2017; Perna & Leigh, 2018). This movement, commonly known as the
Promise or tuition-free college movement, began at the local level in places like Kalamazoo as early as 2005
and has spread rapidly to more than 300 communities (Bartik et al., 2019; Perna & Leigh, 2018; College
Promise, 2017). More recently, state leaders in 16 states have joined the Promise movement, with Tennessee
leading the charge as an early adopter. The tuition-free college movement in Tennessee started at the county
level with the Knox Achieves program, which provided tuition-free college and mentoring to all students in
Knox County beginning in 2008 (Carruthers & Fox, 2016). By 2011-2012, the Knox Achieves program
expanded to cover twenty-two counties across the state and in 2014, the Tennessee state legislature decided
to expand the tuition-free college program to a state-wide universal free community college policy providing
last-dollar assistance and college mentoring to students accepted into the program (Carruthers & Fox, 2016).
The financial aid and the mentoring components of the program were combined to achieve the goal of
increasing college access and success for Tennessee high school students (Tennessee Higher Education
Commission, 2017). To be admitted to the Tennessee Promise program, students have to meet specific
eligibility requirements and enroll in an eligible Promise institution.
For students starting with the graduating class of 2015, high school seniors who graduate from a
Tennessee eligible high school could apply for the Promise program. To receive financial aid under the
Tennessee Promise program, students must complete an application, complete the FAFSA, and qualify for
in-state tuition. All students who apply for the Promise program receive a mentor, who assists with FAFSA
filing and provides encouragement and advice on college options. In the Fall of 2014, almost 90 percent of
high school seniors, or approximately 58,000 students applied for the program and 16,291 students enrolled
in Fall 2015 (National Conference of State Legislators, 2016). [2]
Successful applicants are provided last-dollar assistance covering tuition and fees (i.e. not living and
book expenses) at one of the 27 colleges of applied technology, 13 community colleges or one of the instate private or public 4-year universities that offers an associate’s degree or an equivalent technical
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certificate and are deemed eligible by the Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC). However, the
last-dollar aid cannot be used at an ineligible Promise institution. As one of the central components of the
analysis, it is important to note the number of institutions in each sector that are Promise eligible and
ineligible. In Table 1 below, I provide a description of the Promise eligible and ineligible Tennessee
institutions by ownership and sector.
Table 1
Number of Promise Eligible and Ineligible Tennessee Institutions, by Institution Type
Type of Institution

Promise Eligible
Institutions
2015-16
2016-17

Promise Ineligible
Institutions
2015-16
201617

By Ownership
Public
Private-For-Profit
Private-Non-Profit
By Ownership & Sector
Public 4-year
Public 2-year & Less than 2-year
Private 4-year
Private 2-year & Less than 2-year

42
2
15

42
1
18

8
86
36

8
84
32

2
40
16
1

2
40
18
1

8
0
49
73

8
0
45
71

Based on correspondence with THEC, eligibility is based solely on whether the institution offers an
associate’s degree (either of arts or sciences). Originally, only public universities were going to be eligible,
but based on a compromise with private universities, any institution that offers an associate’s degree was
deemed eligible for the Promise. Additionally, it should be noted that while the Promise scholarship covers
all tuition and fees for associate’s degrees at public universities, students wanting to attend a private
university might not have all of tuition and fees covered. According to THEC, students attending private
universities will only receive the amount of aid that they would have received at a public (based on the
average tuition and fees of the same program at public universities in the state). This makes the potential
impacts on private universities even more likely, as the incentive structure is mainly focused on increasing
college attendance at public universities.

Theoretical Framework
The goal of this study is to estimate the impact of Tennessee Promise eligibility on institutional behavior
and enrollment patterns. While an extensive body of work addresses the effects of financial aid policies on
student outcomes and institutional behavior (Scott-Clayton 2011; McBain 2011; Toutkoushian & Shafiq,
2009; Deming & Dynarksi, 2009; Deming & Walters, 2017), there has not been sufficient scholarly effort
dedicated to investigating the behavioral responses by both institutions and students to tuition-free
community college policies. However, there is an abundance of scholarship on institutional and individual
responses to non-institutional financial aid policies more generally, which I draw upon in my analysis (Doyle
et al. 2009, Long 2004; Lowry 2001; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003; Curs & Dar, 2010a; Delaney & Kearney,
2016). In particular, I leverage literature on resource dependence theory, the Bennett hypothesis, and
emerging Promise policy evaluations to situate this study in existing literature and lay theoretical foundations
3

Journal of Student Financial Aid  Center for Economic Education, University of Louisville  Vol. 50, N1, 2021

Bell: Estimating Spillover Effects of Tennessee Promise

for better understanding the impact of institutional eligibility in the context of state wide tuition-free college
policies.
Shifts in Institutional Behavior
Previous studies investigating the influence of financial-aid policies on institutional behavior use resource
dependence theory (RDT) as the overarching theoretical framework. Generally, resource dependence theory
predicts that an institution's external environment influences the organization's behavior in the pursuit of
adequate resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Delaney & Kearney, 2016). In particular, institutions of higher
education when pressed for financial resources must implement policies that increase revenue generation so
that they may continue to serve students and fulfill their institutional missions (Weisbrod et al., 2008). For
public universities, this behavior may come in the form of lobbying the state government for more
appropriations or for the ability to raise tuition and fees, while private institutions may raise tuition and fees
or pursue other revenue generating measures. Alternatively, institutions could respond by changing
recruitment priorities and attempting to increase access to resources through targeting qualified out-of-state
or international students that bring in more tuition revenue (Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003). In the context of
the Tennessee Promise, ineligible institutions might exhibit these types of risk averse behaviors as they
attempt to cope with the increased competition for qualified in-state students. Indeed, due to the incentives
for students to attend Promise eligible institutions and the massive take up of the program, the Promise
ineligible institutions may have to significantly shift priorities in order to maintain financial solvency.
The next theoretical frame underlying this literature is the Bennett hypothesis, which builds on RDT
by suggesting that institutions will raise tuition in response to increasing levels of student aid from noninstitutional sources (i.e. state or federal government). In this way, institutions can “capture some of the
state financial aid resources through increases in tuition” (Curs & Dar, 2010a, p. 7). However, based on the
mixed findings regarding the effects of rising levels of non-institutional aid (i.e. state or federal financial aid)
on tuition levels in previous studies, the Bennett hypothesis may or may not be an accurate characterization
of institutional behavior. For instance, Rizzo & Ehrenberg (2003) found no significant evidence that federal
or state aid policies changed in-state or out-of-state tuition at public universities. In fact, scholars found that
public institutions actually lower tuition as states invest in more financial aid (Curs & Dar 2010a) and that
public institutions allocate institutional aid based on state policy (Doyle et al., 2009). On the other hand, in
the context of the Georgia HOPE scholarship, scholars have found that institutions with a greater
proportion of HOPE recipients increase tuition and fees at higher levels than other institutions (Long,
2004). Additionally, this revenue capturing behavior has also been identified in the context of Pell grants and
state need-based and merit-based financial aid, especially among private institutions (Singell & Stone, 2007;
Curs & Dar 2010b). Given the mixed nature of previous findings along this line of inquiry, this study will
contribute to the scholarly literature by providing another assessment of the validity of the Bennett
hypothesis in the new and unique context of the Tennessee Promise. Indeed, the Tennessee Promise
represents a deviation from the norm in higher education finance by providing full coverage of tuition and
fees with a comparatively small number of means-tested requirements. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the
number of students participating in the program is enormous. Together, both the universality and high
levels of participation in the Promise program creates serious potential for Promise eligible institutions to
exhibit behavior in line with the Bennett hypothesis.
Furthermore, previous studies suggest that there will likely be heterogeneity in price setting behavior
based on the sector of the institution. As a result of being publicly owned and funded, public institutions
face greater accountability pressure from political leaders, which translates into varying institutional behavior
in the wake of expanded state financial aid resources (Delaney & Hemenway, 2017). Therefore, public
institutions may be especially likely to engage in behavior that aligns with state policy priorities due to a
greater reliance on state government funding. For instance, as alluded to above, studies have found that
increases in Pell funding have resulted in rising tuition at private universities but have not found the same
behavior at public institutions (Singell & Stone, 2007). In addition, it should be noted that the structure of
Journal of Student Financial Aid  Center for Economic Education, University of Louisville  Vol. 50, N1, 2021
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the higher education governance system also influences institutional behavior. For instance, in states with
consolidated governing boards, which have more authority over higher education institutions than
coordinating boards, public universities are more likely to lower net price in response to increased financial
aid while private universities remain unresponsive (Curs & Dar, 2010a). In Tennessee, the state higher
education governance structure is the less authoritative coordinating board, however, public institutions of
higher education do not have significant tuition setting authority. In fact, any shift in tuition and fees has to
be approved by the Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC). The process takes about six months
starting with non-binding guidance from THEC in the fall which establishes the acceptable range of changes
in tuition for public institutions. Then, each public institutions’ board votes to approve tuition and fee
increases which are subject to approval by THEC in the spring and implemented in the following year.
However, according to the meeting minutes of THEC on tuition and fee setting authority, while in-state
tuition and fee rates at public institutions are heavily scrutinized by the commission, private universities and
public out-of-state rates are not under the jurisdiction of the commission to review and approve (Tennessee
Higher Education Commission, 2017). Based on these findings, I distinguish between public and private
institutions in the analysis in order to reveal potential heterogeneity.
Finally, previous studies also suggest that tuition is not the only relevant area in which to observe
shifts in institutional behavior in response to non-institutional aid; scholars have uncovered significant shifts
among in-state fees, out-of-state tuition and room and board in response to shifting state financial policy
environments (Delaney & Kearney, 2016; Long 2004). These behaviors align with RDT in that institutions
were able to secure revenue streams by raising out-of-state tuition or by manipulating less visible elements
of price, while also avoiding the politically infeasible option of raising in-state tuition (Delaney & Kearney,
2016; Long 2004). Based on these findings, one might expect similar institutional behavior in response to
the Tennessee Promise, which sharply increases competition for in-state students. For instance, with the
potential loss in enrollment in mind, one might expect Promise ineligible institutions to raise less visible
elements of price in order to make up for decreasing enrollment in a politically feasible way. However, we
might also expect that ineligible institutions would decrease the marketable, publicized cost so that they
seem competitive with the other institutions and recruit students that pay more in tuition and fees on
average. In order to uncover these shifts in institutional price setting, this analysis includes variables that
capture both in-state and out-of-state combined tuition and fees coupled with measures of required fees
specifically.
Shifts in Enrollment Behavior
Another area of potential impacts is enrollment behavior, which is also likely subject to change in the wake
of Promise implementation. The literature on enrollment trends is dominated by studies on the effects of
state and federal grant aid on college enrollment in general (Dynarski, 2000; Dynarski, 2008; Scott-Clayton,
2011; Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Sjoquist & Winters, 2012; Dynarski, 2003; Lovenheim & Owens,
2014), and for racial and ethnic minorities specifically (Gandara & Li, 2018; Jackson, 1990; John & Noell,
1989; Ches & DesJardin, 2010). Recent extensions of this work uncover the impact of Promise programs on
college enrollment, retention, degree completion, and local economic development (Bartik et al., 2019;
LeGower & Walsh, 2017; Gurantz, 2020; Pluhta & Penny, 2013; Miller-Adams, 2015; Page et al., 2018;
Harris et al., 2018; Gandara & Li, 2018). In line with previous work on the effects of other state and federal
aid policies (Dynarski, 2000; Scott-Clayton, 2011), Promise evaluations have revealed large increases in total
enrollment and particularly pronounced surges in racial and ethnic minority enrollment in response to
Promise policies (Bartik et al., 2015; Pluhta & Penny, 2013; Gandara & Li, 2018; Gurantz, 2020).
Evaluations of the Kalamazoo Promise also reveal that the Promise significantly increased the likelihood of
obtaining a credential, with particularly large effects for racial and ethnic minorities and women (Bartik et al.,
5
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2019). In the context of the Tennessee Promise, it is likely that similar increases in enrollment will occur and
may be particularly pronounced for racial and ethnic minority groups.
In addition, emerging research reveals that Promise programs like the Tennessee Promise may divert
enrollment from four-year colleges to two-year colleges as a result of the limiting eligibility for Promise
funds to two-year degrees (Carruthers & Fox, 2016; Delaney & Hemenway, 2017; Deming 2017; Gurantz,
2020). In their evaluation of the Knox Achieves program [3], Carruthers and Fox (2016) identify increases in
enrollment at two-year colleges, but not at four-year colleges. In fact, the estimates suggested that Knox
Achieves shifted enrollment away from four-year colleges and into two-year colleges. This proposition is
supported by Gurantz (2020), which finds that the Oregon Promise shifted student enrollment to two-year
colleges and away from four-year colleges in the first cohort after the policy was implemented. Together,
these studies suggest that, in the context of the Tennessee Promise, in which aid can only be utilized at some
institutions, one might expect to see heterogeneous effects of the policy on enrollment based on Promise
eligibility, with increases in enrollment concentrated at eligible institutions. [4]

Data Description
I collected the institutional level, annual data for the years 2012-2016 from the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Dataset (IPEDS). For each institution, the key dependent variables of interest for cost of
attendance include the following in nominal dollars: annual average tuition and fees [5], in-state tuition and
fees, out-of-state tuition and fees, in-state required fees, and out-of-state required fees. The dependent
variables measuring Fall enrollment include: the total number of first-time undergraduate students, the
number of in-state and out-of-state first-time undergraduate students enrolled, the percentage of students
that are Black, and the percentage of students that are Hispanic/Latino.
I hand coded the dichotomous treatment variables indicating whether the institution was eligible or
ineligible for the Promise program based on the official list of eligible institutions in 2015 and 2016
according to the Tennessee Higher Education Commission. Interestingly, five private colleges became
eligible in 2016 while three colleges that were eligible for the Promise in 2015 were no longer eligible in
2016. [6] Additionally, it should be noted that some private colleges were no longer in business in 2016, and
any colleges closed during the time period of study are excluded from the analysis. The data are summarized
in Table 2 below.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics (2012-2015)
Sub-Group Means

Full Data

All

Pre

Post

All

Pre

Post

Comparison
Group
All Pre Post

10.4

10.1

10.7

16.4

16.2

16.5

14.2

14.0

14.4

15.4

9.5

In-State Tuition and Fees

8.9

8.8

9.2

15.9

15.8

16.1

13.2

13.1

13.4

14.6

9.9

Out-of-State Tuition and Fees

11.8

11.5

12.2

16.8

16.7

17.1

15.1

14.9

15.3

16.1

9.4

0.58

0.55

0.64

0.66

0.64

0.68

0.75

0.71

0.81

0.76

1.3

Promise

Non-Promise

Mea
n

SD

Outcome Variables
Price (in thousands)
Tuition and Fees

In-State Fees
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17
328
17
201
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Out-of-State Fees
Enrollment
Percent Black
Enrollment
Percent Hispanic
Enrollment
Total Enrollment
In-State Enrollment
Out-of-State Enrollment

0.67

0.64

0.71

0.67

0.65

0.69

0.86

0.81

0.93

0.81

1.6

0.18

0.18

0.18

0.31

0.32

0.30

0.28

0.28

0.28

0.19

0.22

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.04

0.03

0.05

0.04

0.03

0.04

0.14

0.19

246
0
536.
3

246
4
474.
9

244
9
818.
9

130
6
236.
7

2623
.3
466.
1

42.8

60.3

71.9

237
8
426.
4
108.
3

239
8
396.
3

45.9

123
1
378.
4
140.
5

5790
.9
915.
3
293.
7

1333
214.
6
61.2

99.8

Note: All Cost of Attendance variables are presented in thousands for ease of interpretation.

2316
601.
1
158.
1

90.3

201
18
269
75
269
75
269
75
183
60
183
60

In Table 2, I also include the means for Promise eligible and ineligible institutions as well as the
comparison group of institutions for both pre- and post-implementation years. While there are not many
significant descriptive changes in these means in pre- and post-implementation for all institutions, these
estimates neglect heterogeneity by the sector of the institution, which will be explored in the formal analysis.

Sample and Measures
The sample consists of all postsecondary institutions in Tennessee, including colleges eligible and ineligible
for the Tennessee Promise program. In addition, I gather data on institutions in all states to provide an
additional comparison group to test the robustness of the results and increase confidence in the estimates.
Furthermore, based on previous research, I include a multitude of measures for the cost of
attendance to capture more nuanced variation in the institutional pricing behavior (Long, 2004). Specifically,
distinguishing between in-state and out-of-state tuition and fees will capture the potential for institutions to
differentially shift pricing based on the residence of the student. Finally, isolating the in-state required fees
and the out-of-state required fees can illuminate whether institutions are keeping tuition stable, but
manipulating fees.
Likewise, the various measures of enrollment trends capture multiple potential areas for shifts to
occur. While total undergraduate enrollment is interesting, the difference between the enrollment of in-state
and out-of-state students may also reveal shifting institutional priorities in recruitment. Additionally, the
shifts in enrollment among racial and ethnic minorities also provides a more nuanced analysis of the types of
students whose enrollment behavior is changing in the aftermath of the Tennessee Promise implementation.
Empirical Approach
To evaluate the effects of Tennessee Promise eligibility on tuition and fees and enrollment, I utilize the
introduction of the Promise program as a natural or quasi-experiment. Specifically, I employ a difference-indifferences design that compares the key outcomes of interest across institutions impacted by the Tennessee
Promise and a comparison set of institutions before and after the introduction of the Promise policy
(Morgan & Winship 2014; Furquim, Corral, & Hillman, 2019). As such, the specification of the comparison
group is especially important for the validity of the design. For this reason, I perform the analysis on
multiple comparison groups. In the results presented below, I utilize the most empirically robust and
theoretically relevant comparison group, which consists of neighboring states with similar higher education
7
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governance structures (coordinating boards). [7] Within this analysis, there are three groups of institutions:
the first group is made up of institutions in Tennessee eligible for the Tennessee Promise funds, the second
group is made up of the institutions in Tennessee not eligible for Tennessee Promise funds, and the final
group is made up of institutions in neighboring states with similar governance structures, which serves as
comparison group.
By incorporating this comparison group of institutions, that might be affected by other events that
could be influencing Tennessee institutions but not through the treatment (Tennessee Promise), I effectively
increase internal validity and reduce the likelihood of omitted variable bias. Furthermore, by using the
timing of an intervention as my source of plausibly exogenous variation, I am able to estimate the difference
in post-implementation outcomes (enrollment and tuition and fees) for ineligible and for eligible Tennessee
Promise institutions as compared to the institutions in the comparison group.
The standard difference-in-differences design is implemented in a regression framework that is
presented in the equation below.
Priceit = ∝ + Tt + Promisei + β(Promisei *Tt ) + αi + λt + ϵi,t
(1)
Enrollit = ∝ + Tt + Promisei + β(Promisei *Tt ) + αi + λt + ϵi,t
(2)
In this model, the outcome variables (Priceit & Enrollit ) are a function of a constant (𝛼), an
institution fixed effect (αi ), a year fixed effect (λt ), a set of covariates (Xi,t), an error term (ϵi,t ), and an
interaction between a dummy for eligibility or ineligibility for Tennessee Promise funds (Promisei ) and a
dummy indicating post Promise implementation (Tt ). The models are conducted separately for eligible and
ineligible institutions, with the parameter of interest (β) revealing the association between Promise eligibility
or ineligibility and the outcomes of interest. Institutional level covariates are not included in any of the
models because the institutional fixed effect should capture this variation and residual variation should just
be considered measurement error.
Identification Assumptions
The primary identification assumption of the difference-in-differences research design is that in the absence
of the Tennessee Promise, the outcomes of interest would have continued the trajectory observed in the
pre-treatment years—this is commonly known as the parallel trends assumption. To ensure the estimates are
unbiased and that observed changes are due to the Tennessee Promise and not pre-existing trends in
outcome measures, I plot the trajectory of the key outcomes of interest for Promise eligible, Promise
ineligible and comparison institutions in Figure 1. This figure provides preliminary evidence in support of
the parallel trends assumption; neither of the treatment groups exhibit drastically different pre-treatment
trends in tuition and fees and total enrollment compared to the comparison group. This suggests that in the
absence of the Tennessee Promise, it is plausible to assume that the treatment and control groups would
have continued along the same trajectory, and that any difference in outcomes after 2014-15 is due to the
implementation of the Tennessee Promise.
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Figure 1. Assessment of Parallel Trends in Institutions Impacted by Tennessee Promise and Institutions in the Comparison
Group
Another important identification assumption of this design is that any relative shift in the outcomes
are attributable to shifts in response to the implementation of the Promise program and not another policy
that was implemented simultaneously. After researching the major reforms in Tennessee during the time
period of study, I find that there are no simultaneous reforms that would likely bias the tuition and fees
estimates. However, there were reforms targeting enrollment that could serve as a barrier to uncovering causal
estimates. One of the major programs that could pose a threat to validity in the enrollment models is the
Seamless Alignment and Integrated Learning Support (SAILS) program, which was implemented as a pilot
at Chattanooga State Community College in 2012 and expanded in 2014. This program sought to increase
college outcomes by improving remedial math education for community college students. However, the
program was found to have no effect on college enrollment, so the effects I uncover in the difference-inJournal of Student Financial Aid  Center for Economic Education, University of Louisville  Vol. 50, N1, 2021
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differences estimates on enrollment are not driven by this simultaneously occurring program (Kane et al.,
2020). The other key program that could pose a threat to validity is the Knox Achieves program—
implemented for the class of 2009-10 Knox County high school graduates. This program caused an increase
in two-year college enrollment (3-4 percentage points) and a decrease in four-year college enrollment
(approximately 1 percentage point) among students in Knox County in cohorts 2009-10 through 2010-2011
(Carruthers & Fox, 2016). The Knox Achieves program was expanded to twenty-two counties after the
2011-12 cohort, and in 2014 the Tennessee Promise was enacted for the entire state. It is important to note
that this means the Knox Achieves program was in place for some students during the cohorts prior to
Tennessee Promise implementation. This introduces the possibility that because some students were already
eligible for a tuition-free community college program in Tennessee in the pre-Tennessee Promise years, my
estimates could have a downward bias. While it would be ideal to be able to isolate the students that were
impacted by Knox Achieves in the pre-Tennessee Promise years, this is not possible with the institutional
level data that I utilize in this study. Therefore, the treatment I measure is for the expansion of the tuitionfree college programs in Tennessee to cover the state-wide population, rather than an isolated impact of one
policy with no predecessor. In other words, I utilize the discontinuous timing of implementation in 2014—
when the Knox Achieves program was already in place for seven cohorts of students—to estimate the effect
of the state-wide expansion of tuition-free college in Tennessee. With this context in mind, I move to
presenting the difference-in-differences estimates in the next section and describe the robustness checks and
alternative specifications and multiple comparison groups thereafter.

Enrollment Results
In Table 3, I present the difference-in-difference estimates for changes in enrollment among Promise
eligible and ineligible institutions. First, the results are presented on the full sample of institutions. In the
models on the full sample, the most striking result is the large and statistically significant positive increase in
in-state enrollment at Promise eligible institutions. In contrast, the estimates for changes in enrollment at
Promise ineligible institutions are insignificant. However, these average estimates of Tennessee Promise
eligibility on all institutions mask significant heterogeneity that emerges when I distinguish between
institutional sector.
Table 3
Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Enrollment
Enrollment Counts

In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible

Total
In-state
Enrollment
All Institutions

Percent Racial Minority
Out-ofState

% Black

%
Hispanic

-5.640
(10.56)

8.129
(5.833)

-0.013
(0.0089)

0.0029
(0.0027)

51.75
138.8**
(55.31)
(30.64)
4411
3285
928
908
Public Institutions

-0.435
(5.340)
3285
908

-0.004
(0.003)
3582
927

0.0033
(0.0019)
3582
927

48.46
(28.06)

Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions
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In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible

-236.8
(227.6)

-139.8*
(70.21)

69.41*
(34.37)

0.0035
(0.0032)

-0.0023
(0.0012)

166.3
199.4**
(85.25)
(38.78)
1380
1200
277
273
Private Institutions

-9.692
(8.686)
1200
273

-0.0043
(0.0032)
1104
277

0.0009
(0.0021)
1104
277

28.38
(17.04)

5.149
(4.989)

7.524
(4.296)

-0.0170
(0.0097)

0.0047
(0.0030)

4.080
(57.58)
3031
651

6.298
(23.66)
2085
635

1.962
(7.382)
2085
635

0.0074
(0.0063)
2478
650

0.0041
(0.0042)
2478
650

Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible
Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions

Note: ∗∗ p < .01; ∗ p < .05 Robust standard errors clustered by institution in parentheses. The comparison group results are
based on states that are bordering Tennessee and have similar higher education governance structures (i.e. coordinating boards
instead of governing boards)
Next, I present the standard difference-in-difference estimates for public and private institutions in
the bottom two panels of Table 3. First, when the sample is restricted to public institutions, enrollment
shifts among public ineligible (four-year) universities become apparent. In particular, this analysis reveals
that ineligible public (four-year) universities are facing large and statistically significant declines in in-state
enrollment in post-implementation years. On the other hand, the ineligible public (four-year) universities are
simultaneously experiencing a statistically significant increase in out-of-state enrollment. In contrast,
enrollment at private ineligible institutions does not appear to be similarly impacted by the Promise policy.
Together, these results suggest that there are significant enrollment shifts across sector after the Tennessee
Promise was implemented.

Tuition and Fees Results
Next, I present the difference-in-differences results for the impact of Tennessee Promise eligibility on
tuition and fees in Table 4 below. [9] The vast majority of these estimates do not reach conventional
statistical significance standards with the exception of average tuition and fees for ineligible institutions. This
analysis reveals that ineligible Promise institutions appear to increase tuition and fees in post-Promise
implementation years (p<0.05). However, given that these results are not consistent when utilizing an
alternative comparison group (see Appendix Table A2), this finding should be interpreted with caution.
Table 4
Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Price
Tuition and Fees
Average

In-state

Out-of-State

Required Fees
In-state

Out-ofState
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In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible

All Institutions
319.0*
(161.5)

238.0
(213.6)

63.36
(271.4)

-26.51
(31.89)

-40.03
(32.57)

110.8
(174.7)
4329

53.60
(281.1)
2895

248.8
(323.6)
2895

-52.22
(30.02)
2895

-53.27
(32.14)
2895

618

618

-1161.0
(1115.1)

34.87
(56.06)

-1.212
(56.30)

617.8** 405.3**
750.6*
(165.7)
(120.5)
(359.3)
1363
1100
1100
277
224
224
Private Institutions

-112.1**
(19.57)
1100
224

-121.2**
(32.06)
1100
224

231.6
(174.7)

40.73
(245.2)

40.73
(245.2)

-15.40
(36.90)

-15.40
(36.90)

-172.6
(563.9)
2966
644

-118.3
(564.7)
1795
394

-118.3
(564.7)
1795
394

-5.415
(57.84)
1795
394

-5.415
(57.84)
1795
394

Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible

921
618
618
Public Institutions
-819.4
(526.3)

-208.1
(175.8)

Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible
Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions

Note: ∗∗ p < .01; ∗ p < .05 Robust standard errors clustered by institution in parentheses. The comparison group results are
based on states that are bordering Tennessee and have similar higher education governance structures (i.e. coordinating boards
instead of governing boards)
When the sample is restricted to public institutions, the results suggest that Promise eligible public
universities are increasing tuition and fees after the Tennessee Promise was implemented. These changes in
tuition and fees suggests that public Promise eligible institutions may be lobbying THEC for increases in
tuition so that they can keep up with the student services and administrative expenses that accompany large
increases in enrollment. Additionally, and unexpectedly, these estimates suggest public eligible institutions
are also lowering required fee levels in the aftermath of the Promise policy. However, the change in fees
appears to be outweighed by the substantively large increase in tuition levels. Finally, private institutions do
not exhibit significant changes in tuition and fees in post-Promise implementation years.
Robustness Checks
The robustness checks, including an alternative comparison group assessment, and an analysis with
institution-specific linear time trends are presented in Appendices A-B. [10] The analysis utilizing all states as
the alternative comparison group is presented in Appendix A. These results are overall remarkably
consistent which suggests that the results are not sensitive to changes in the comparison group. Indeed,
13
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when using all states as the alternative comparison group, the shifting in-state and out-of-state enrollment at
public eligible and ineligible colleges are consistent. Additionally, the findings reveal similar estimates
regarding the increase in tuition and decrease in fees among public Promise eligible institutions. One
interesting difference emerges, however, due to the increase in power. For ineligible private institutions, the
decrease in black student enrollment is statistically significant in these models (p<0.05), suggesting that
private ineligible institutions are experiencing a drop in black enrollment following the implementation of
the Promise policy. Together, the consistency of these results provides more support for the findings
regarding shifting enrollment and tuition in the aftermath of the Tennessee Promise.
Next, I conduct the difference-in-difference analysis with the addition of institution-specific linear
time trends in Appendix B. This technique should account for unobserved heterogeneity that is not being
captured in the institution and year fixed effects which should soak up residual variation. These models are
encouragingly consistent with the results presented in the main analysis, which improves the confidence in
the estimates presented above. In line with the results presented in Appendix A, ineligible private
institutions experience a statistically significant decline in black student enrollment after the Tennessee
Promise is implemented. Additionally, these results reveal the same increase in enrollment at public Promise
eligible institutions and decrease in in-state enrollment at public Promise ineligible institutions. Moreover,
the results for shifts in tuition and fees reveal the same increase in tuition at public Promise eligible
institutions.

Discussion
As expected, enrollment and tuition levels shifted significantly in the aftermath of the Tennessee Promise
implementation in 2014. There are important caveats and context to consider when interpreting these
findings. Given that Knox Achieves was already providing tuition-free community college for students in 22
different counties in Tennessee by 2012, my estimates reflect the changes in enrollment and price following
the expansion of tuition-free college to the state level in 2014. Therefore, my estimates may have a
downward bias due to students in the pre-implementation period already receiving the treatment in some
counties. I encourage readers to interpret the findings with this context in mind and caution against causal
interpretations given the potential for simultaneous reforms to bias the estimates. Nevertheless, the findings
provide significant insight into the descriptive changes in tuition and enrollment in the aftermath of the
Tennessee Promise among Promise eligible and Promise ineligible institutions. First, the findings reveal
significant enrollment shifts across Promise eligible and ineligible institutions. Second, I find significant
increases in tuition among public Promise eligible institutions after the Tennessee Promise was
implemented.
To the first point, as expected, public Promise eligible institutions experienced large in-state
enrollment gains, which is in line with previous research on Promise programs (Gurantz, 2020; Carruthers &
Fox, 2016; Gandara & Li, 2018; Bartik et al., 2019; Page et al., 2018). It is important to note that these
increases in in-state enrollment appear to be driven by surges in enrollment at public Promise eligible
institutions, not private Promise eligible institutions. On the other hand, public Promise ineligible institutions
(public four-year colleges) experienced significant decreases in in-state enrollment and a significant increase
in out-of-state enrollment. This provides some evidence to suggest that students may be enrolling in
Promise eligible public two-year colleges rather than public four-year colleges that are ineligible for Promise
funds (Gurantz, 2020; Carruthers & Fox, 2016). Second, these findings support RDT and previous research,
highlighting the tendency for administrators to recruit more out-of-state students (that pay higher tuition
rates on average) to make up for declining in-state enrollment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Delaney & Kearney
2016). Taken together, these results likely reflect ineligible public organizations’ attempting to ensure their
fiscal stability and survival during a rapidly shifting higher education funding climate.
Next, the findings reveal significant increases in tuition among public Promise eligible institutions,
which provides support for the Bennett hypothesis. It is not entirely surprising that Promise eligible public
Journal of Student Financial Aid  Center for Economic Education, University of Louisville  Vol. 50, N1, 2021
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institutions, that are likely already under-resourced (Deming & Walters, 2017), raise tuition and fees in
response to the availability of state subsidies. However, based on previous research that finds private
institutions to be particularly susceptible to behavior in line with the Bennett hypothesis, it is surprising that
public institutions instead of private institutions are raising tuition. This is particularly surprising because in
Tennessee public institutions must convince state higher education leaders that they need additional funding
in order to be able to raise tuition and fees levels. Therefore, it could also be the case that Promise
institutions are attempting to raise more revenue through tuition and fees due to the increased cost of
administration and student services following explosive growth in enrollment.
Finally, in line with previous research, racial and ethnic minority enrollment shifted following the
implementation of the Tennessee Promise policy (Dynarski, 2000; Scott-Clayton, 2011; St. John & Noell,
1989). Specifically, the percentage of Black students at private Promise ineligible institutions declined by
around 1-2 percentage points. Therefore, it is possible that the financial incentives were particularly
impactful for Black students, which would align with recent research on free community college programs
(Gandara & Li, 2018). These enrollment shifts could potentially have an impact on the racial and ethnic
diversity at both Promise eligible and ineligible institutions, which should be explored in future research. Yet
again, this reflects another potential consequence of Promise policies that should be considered when
determining which institutions are eligible and ineligible for Promise funds.

Conclusion
In the wake of rapidly diffusing tuition-free community college policies, it is essential for scholars to better
understand the likely consequences of design choices such as limiting institutional eligibility for Promise
funds. Based on the results above, two main insights from this study should guide future discussions of
institutional eligibility.
First, shifting student enrollment behavior in the aftermath of Promise program implementation can
fundamentally shift the incentives and constraints that institutions face, which can translate to changing
institutional behavior. As more students attend Promise eligible institutions ineligible institutions bear the
brunt of these shifts in resource constraints, which has serious implications for institutional behavior. In
fact, in a recent interview, the president of the University of Tennessee-Martin said that administrators are
working to counter displaced enrollment by recruiting out-of-state students and incentivizing students to
transfer from eligible Tennessee Promise institutions (Tamburin, 2015). In line with these comments, my
findings do suggest that there was significant enrollment shifts across institutions that were eligible and
ineligible to receive Promise funds. Indeed, the most striking results reveal the substantial decline in
enrollment at ineligible public (four-year) universities, as well as the displacement of racial and ethnic
minority student enrollment away from private ineligible institutions. This could be problematic if by only
allowing Promise aid to flow to mainly two-year institutions, we encourage highly qualified students to
undermatch (Smith et al., 2013; Pallais & Turner, 2006; Hoxby & Avery, 2013; Dillon & Smith, 2017).
Furthermore, scholars are beginning to question whether only incentivizing attendance at institutions with
the fewest resources (community colleges) will not increase college attainment as originally intended
(Deming, 2017). This is particularly problematic given the vast increases in enrollment at low resource
institutions, that may not be able to offer the same level of quality services in the face of rapid student
enrollment growth (Deming, 2017).
Second, eligibility for Promise funds may lead to increases in tuition and fees, especially due to the
nature of the policy design. In-state students no longer have to worry about the sticker price of tuition and
fees if they meet the eligibility requirements for the program, which leaves Promise eligible institutions
without much incentive to control tuition levels. However, given that the institutions that were raising
tuition are public Promise eligible universities that have to work with state officials, this finding likely reveals
15
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the cooperation between these universities and the coordinating board in Tennessee to recognize the
increased cost of delivering services in the midst of rapid increases in student enrollment.
Moving forward, scholars should investigate the effects of limiting institutional eligibility in other
state and local contexts, such as New York and Kentucky. Expanding these types of analyses will enable a
better scholarly understanding of the ways in which institutions of higher education respond to free-tuition
programs when they are excluded from eligibility. Finally, researchers should utilize individual-level data to
investigate the undermatch hypothesis in the context of free-tuition policies in which only two-year
universities are eligible.

Implications for Practice

There are three main takeaways from the findings. First, I find that after the Tennessee Promise was
implemented, students flocked to public Promise eligible institutions (mainly public two-year and technical
colleges). In contrast, public four-year universities that were ineligible to receive Promise funds experienced
decreases in in-state enrollment and increases in out-of-state enrollment. Third, public Promise eligible
institutions (mainly public two-year and technical colleges) raised tuition after the Tennessee Promise was
implemented.
• Policy decisions regarding which colleges can receive Promise funds will shape student
enrollment decisions. If Promise policies only provide funds for two-year degrees, students who
may have attended a four-year college may be diverted to a two-year community or technical college.
Given that community and technical colleges have lower levels of per pupil funding and attainment
rates, this diversion of enrollment could undermine the goals of Promise programs and suppress
bachelor’s degree attainment.
• Four-year colleges ineligible for Promise funds may need to enact revenue enhancing
measures to offset corresponding budget deficits if in-state enrollment declines. In the
context of Tennessee, public four-year colleges ineligible for Promise funds appear to have recruited
more out-of-state students to offset the in-state enrollment shortfall. Other possible strategies could
be articulation agreements with two-year colleges that minimize the loss of credit hours and ensure a
smooth transition to four-year colleges for transfer students.
• Colleges that are eligible for Promise funds may raise prices to capture additional state
subsidies. With the rise in government subsidies to students, institutions may be incentivized to
raise prices to secure and enhance revenue streams. It is possible that colleges experiencing sharp
increases in enrollment due to Promise programs could face capacity constraints and may raise
prices to expand capacity for additional student support services and administration expenses.
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Notes
[1] See College Promise for a detailed description of all the states, regions and localities that have
implemented these Promise policies.
[2] The difference between the number of applicants and recipients reflects the number of students that did
not meet eligibility requirements, or attended colleges outside of Tennessee Promise eligibility, or those
students who did not end up enrolling in college full-time or at all.
[3] The Knox Achieves program was the regional last-dollar scholarship in Knox County, Tennessee that
motivated the passage of the Tennessee Promise.
[4] Even for those students whose tuition and fees would have been covered by Pell grants, the messaging
of free community college may also induce higher levels of enrollment, even though these students don’t
receive any additional financial aid.
[5] This measure includes both institutions reporting tuition and fees at the institutional level, and the
program level. I utilize combined tuition and fees due to the lack of isolated tuition measures for institutions
reporting by program. To combine these measures, I take the tuition and fees of the largest program at the
latter type of institution as the proxy measure of tuition and fees at these institutions. It should be noted
that the tuition and fees data is limited by its inability to capture within institution variation tuition and fees
levels by program. In the measure of tuition and fees, the annual tuition and fees of the largest program are
presented for the institutions reporting by program. This may mask variation among tuition levels by the
type of program, but the data does provide an annual average tuition and fees that differentiates between instate and out-of-state students.
[6] I also run the analysis without the institutions that switch from Promise eligible to ineligible or vice
versa. These results are available upon request.
[7] These states are Alabama, Kentucky, Arkansas, Virginia, Missouri, and South Carolina. Based on the
work of policy diffusion scholars (Shipan and Volden 2008) and higher education policy scholars on
governance structures (Knott and Payne 2004), this comparison group should (and does) provide the best
approximation of a hypothetical counterfactual to Tennessee institutions.
[8] For all of the models, standard errors are clustered at the institution level in accordance with the best
practices advocated by Bertrand et al. (2002).
[9] It should be noted that private institutions did not indicate a difference between in-state and out-of-state
tuition and fee measures. Thus, these results do not give us an idea of whether the tuition and fees varies for
in-state and out-of-state students.
[10] I have also conducted an event-study analysis in which I can formally test for the presence of pretreatment trends. The results of these models are available upon request. I had to remove them due to the
length restrictions in the submission guidelines.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Robustness Analysis with Alternative Comparison Group
Table A1. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Enrollment with All States as Comparison Group
Enrollment Counts
Percent Racial Minority

In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible

Total
In-state
Enrollment
All Institutions

Out-ofState

% Black

%
Hispanic

-21.45
(15.25)

7.707
(8.174)

-0.015
(0.0094)

-0.00286
(0.00283)

15.64
156.7**
(39.87)
(44.02)
26975
18360
7065
6777
Public Institutions

4.180
(5.505)
18360
6777

-0.0032
(0.0028)
26975
7065

-0.00312
(0.00167)
26975
7065

-316.6
(215.8)

-153.2**
(57.06)

61.34*
(23.35)

-0.001
(0.0034)

-0.0087**
(0.00110)

83.75
218.9**
(58.00)
(56.67)
7780
6248
1967
1934
Private Institutions

-1.063
(7.165)
6248
1934

-0.004
(0.0028)
7780
1967

-0.003
(0.002)
7780
1967

15.31
(16.49)

-4.974
(6.885)

2.027
(5.313)

-0.0167*
(0.0051)

-0.00125
(0.00304)

-37.16
(41.78)
3031
651

8.464
(5.116)
2085
635

6.863
(5.708)
2085
635

0.0018
(0.0054)
2478
650

-0.00249
(0.00282)
2478
650

13.36
(21.45)

Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible
Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible
Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions

Note: ∗∗ p < .01; ∗ p < .05 Robust standard errors clustered by institution in parentheses. These results
utilize institutions in all other states as the comparison group.
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Table A2. Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Price with All States as Comparison Group
Tuition and Fees
Average
In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible

In-state

Required Fees

Out-of-State

In-state

Out-ofState

All Institutions
-15.56
(242.5)

93.92
(226.4)

-125.0
(284.8)

-27.19
(32.54)

-29.77
(33.46)

26.00
(237.1)
20116

-33.33
(232.5)
20116

85.33
(255.6)
20116

11.16
(28.22)
19974

17.64
(30.02)
19974

4312

4312

-1,221
(1,260)

83.88
(64.16)

73.17
(64.57)

598.2** 462.0**
734.3**
(157.7)
(90.13)
(272.6)
8006
8006
8006
1641
1641
1641
Private Institutions

-44.23*
(19.92)
8006
1641

-28.54
(32.79)
8006
1641

-323.7
(255.8)

-323.7
(255.8)

-323.7
(255.8)

-39.04
(35.04)

-39.04
(35.04)

-392.7
(399.2)
11967
2670

-392.7
(399.2)
11967
2670

-392.7
(399.2)
11967
2670

53.38
(45.84)
11967
2670

53.38
(45.84)
11967
2670

Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible

4454
4454
4454
Public Institutions
-607.3
(593.8)

6.753
(156.5)

Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible
Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions

Note: ∗∗ p < .01; ∗ p < .05 Robust standard errors clustered by institution in parentheses. These results
utilize institutions in all other states as the comparison group.
Appendix B: Robustness Analysis- Results with Institution-Specific Linear Time Trends
Table 1B. Difference-in-Differences Enrollment Estimates with Linear Specific Time Trends

In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible

Enrollment Counts
Total
In-state
Enrollment
All Institutions

Out-ofState

Percent Racial Minority
% Black
%
Hispanic

5.88
(17.31)

-19.62
(11.45)

2.82
(4.71)

-0.028**
(0.013)

0.0025
(0.004)

82.19**
(30.04)
4411
928

135.24**
(38.54)
3285
908

1.14
(4.64)
3285
908

0.003
(0.005)
3582
927

0.006
(0.002)
3582
927

Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions
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Public Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible

6.270
(204.0)

-177.1**
(42.63)

13.90
(15.74)

0.00783*
(0.0034)

-0.0022
(0.0014)

117.3**
175.5**
(41.88)
(47.08)
1380
1200
277
273
Private Institutions

1.983
(5.914)
1200
273

-0.0013
(0.0056)
1104
277

-0.0022
(0.0025)
1104
277

10.81
(11.66)

4.569
(7.370)

1.579
(5.288)

-0.028*
(0.0132)

0.0029
(0.0039)

-15.14
(30.19)
3031
651

14.57
(29.23)
2085
635

0.688
(9.064)
2085
635

0.0074
(0.0087)
2478
650

0.0055
(0.0037)
2478
650

Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible
Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible
N
N Institutions

Note: ∗∗ p < .01; ∗ p < .05 Robust standard errors clustered by institution in parentheses. The comparison
group results are based on states that are bordering Tennessee and have similar higher education governance
structures (i.e. coordinating boards instead of governing boards.
Table 2B. Difference-in-Differences Price Estimates with Linear Specific Time Trends
Tuition and Fees
Required Fees
Average
In-state
Out-ofIn-state
Out-of-State
State
All Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
236.5
73.43
16.41
-1.090
-2.836
Post * ineligible
(184.6)
(204.4)
(294.1)
(32.32)
(32.33)
Promise Eligible Institutions
298.2
58.86
34.74
14.55
10.78
Post * eligible
(200.8)
(297.7)
(345.6)
(36.12)
(36.27)
N
4329
2895
2895
2895
2895
N Institutions
921
618
618
618
618
Public Institutions
In-Eligible Institutions
-1,607*
-885.9**
-1,931
-91.32**
-93.23**
Post * ineligible
(585.8)
(257.6)
(1,224)
(27.17)
(28.01)
Promise Eligible Institutions
858.5**
601.9**
616.7
-7.295
-15.78
Post * eligible
(202.9)
(167.1)
(417.1)
(18.99)
(19.58)
N
1363
1100
1100
1100
1100
N Institutions
277
224
224
224
224
Private Institutions
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In-Eligible Institutions
Post * ineligible

288.8
(199.6)

93.21
(222.1)

93.21
(222.1)

-0.853
(37.60)

-0.853
(37.60)

-471.3
(588.6)
2966
644

-418.5
(581.5)
1795
394

-418.5
(581.5)
1795
394

46.62
(69.65)
1795
394

46.62
(69.65)
1795
394

Promise Eligible Institutions
Post * eligible

N
N Institutions
Note: ∗∗ p < .01; ∗ p < .05 Robust standard errors clustered by institution in parentheses. The comparison
group results are based on states that are bordering Tennessee and have similar higher education governance
structures (i.e. . coordinating boards instead of governing boards)
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